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IN HELMAN v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
faced an issue of first impression-whether the Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA) applies to an aviation accident occur-
ring between three and twelve nautical miles from the U.S.
shore.' This case exemplifies how an ambiguous statute can cre-
ate inconsistencies between courts attempting to determine con-
gressional intent. Here, the court looked to a Second Circuit
holding, the statute's plain meaning, legislative history, statutory
amendments, and even a presidential proclamation to deter-
mine the statute's meaning.2 In doing so, the court found
DOHSA applies to noncommercial aviation accidents occurring
more than three nautical miles from the U.S. shore.3
In 2007, while performing military helicopter training exer-
cises off the coast of Catalina Island, California, the helicopter
crashed into the Pacific Ocean, killing three U.S. Navy crew-
men.4 The crash occurred 9.5 nautical miles from the island's
coast.5 Subsequently, the crewmen's personal representatives
and successors in interest filed suit in the Superior Court of Cali-
fornia in Los Angeles County against Alcoa Global Fasteners,
Inc., Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky), and other heli-
copter and component manufacturers.' The complaint alleged
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2 See generally id.
3 Id. at 993.




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
"defects in the helicopter and its component parts caused the
accident. ' 7 Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted claims for
"products liability, negligence, failure to warn, breach of war-
ranty, and wrongful death and survival under California law and
general maritime law." Although the facts of the case appear
straightforward, the legal issue before the court is complex; and
if followed by other courts, it will potentially impact future liti-
gants attempting to recover from an aviation accident occurring
between three and twelve nautical miles from the U.S. shore be-
cause DOHSA would "preempt all other remedies for wrongful
death."'
Subsequently, the case was removed to the U.S. District Court
in the Central District of California pursuant to federal subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a) (1) because Sikor-
sky "was acting under an officer of the United States under color
of such office at the time of the accident."1 ° Once removed to
district court, Sikorsky argued that DOHSA preempted the
plaintiffs' state-law claims and filed a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings.1" Following this motion, the re-
maining defendants filed a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted based
on the same preemption argument. 12 The district court ruled
on these motions and held that "in the case of a non-commer-
cial aircraft accident, DOHSA becomes applicable beyond three
nautical miles from shore," and granted the defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss.' 3 The plaintiffs immediately requested an inter-
locutory order of appeal, which the Ninth Circuit granted. 4
The sole issue on appeal is whether the statutory remedy pro-
vided by DOHSA applies to noncommercial accidents occurring
between three and twelve nautical miles from the U.S. shore.
15
The Ninth Circuit held DOHSA applies to the area between
three and twelve nautical miles off the U.S. shore, and thus
DOHSA governs recovery.' 6 The court primarily relied on the
7 Id.
8 Id.
'9 Id. at 989.
'0 Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners Inc., No. CV 09-1353 SVW (FFMx), 2009
WL 2058541, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2009).
11 Helman, 637 F.3d at 988.
12 Id.
13 Helman, 2009 WIL 2058541, at *1.
14 Helman, 637 F.3d at 988.
15 Id. at 989, 993.
16 Id. at 993.
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plain meaning of DOHSA, which "provides a federal statutory
remedy for wrongful death occurring at sea,"17 in pertinent part:
When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neg-
lect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from
the shore of the United States, the personal representative of the de-
cedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or
vessel responsible. The action shall be for the exclusive benefit
of the decedent's spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative.'"
In determining whether DOHSA applies to the area between
three and twelve nautical miles, the court first looked at In re Air
Crash off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996 (TWA Flight
800)-the only circuit court case addressing DOHSA's applica-
bility to this area-but, after analyzing the plain language of the
statute and subsequent amendments, the court reached the op-
posite conclusion from the Second Circuit.1 9
The Second Circuit case concerned a 1996 commercial flight
crash occurring eight nautical miles off the coast of Long Island,
New York, killing all 230 passengers. 20 Estate representatives of
the deceased sued Trans World Airlines and Boeing Company
for wrongful death. 21 The defendants claimed DOHSA applied
and limited recovery to pecuniary damages.22 Whereas the
plaintiffs, relying on DOHSA, which read at the time, "occurring
on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore," ar-
gued DOHSA applied to waters beyond twelve nautical miles
from the shore and did not limit recovery. 23 The Second Circuit
found the term "high seas" to mean international waters beyond
twelve nautical miles from the U.S. shore in accordance with
President Ronald Reagan's 1988 Presidential Proclamation
Number 5928, which extended U.S. territorial waters to twelve
nautical miles from shore.24  However, then Circuit Judge
Sotomayor wrote an extensive dissent as to why Congress did not
intend "high seas" to mean international waters, and that "be-
yond a marine league" clarifies where "high seas" begins geo-
graphically. 25 Sotomayor also argued strongly that a presidential
17 Id. at 989, 991.
18 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006) (emphasis added).
'9 See Helman, 637 F.3d at 989-93; In re Air Crash off Long Island, N.Y., on July
17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 2000).
20 In re Air Crash off Long Island, N.Y, 209 F.3d at 201.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 202.
24 Id. at 212-13, 215.
25 Id. at 223 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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proclamation could not extend the boundaries Congress statu-
torily defined, especially when the proclamation extended the
territorial waters for the "limited purposd' of international law and
"limit[ed] its application," so as to not alter existing federal or
state law. 6
In Helman, the Ninth Circuit relied on Sotomayor's legal rea-
soning as opposed to the majority holding. The Ninth Circuit
considered the plain reading and statutory construction of
DOHSA. 27 Courts often adhere to the statutory construction
principle that "'no clause, sentence, or word shall be superflu-
ous, void, or insignificant.' ,,28 As such, the plaintiffs argued that
the terms "high seas" and "beyond a marine league" must be
interpreted independently, and "high seas" cannot be ignored
as superfluous. 29 However, the court found no need to read
these terms independently and believed to do so would produce
an illogical conclusion.3 0 If "high seas" were considered "inter-
national waters," which tends to be a "fluid political concept"
that President Reagan altered to twelve nautical miles merely by
a proclamation and President Clinton later shifted to twenty-
four nautical miles, Congress would simply allow the President
to alter the meaning of its statutes and have no need to include
the specific length, "beyond a marine league," in the original
text. 1 Instead of allowing this flexibility, which Congress would
likely not intend when it provided a specific distance, the court
reasoned the enacting "Congress understood 'beyond a marine
league' and 'high seas' to be functionally equivalent. '3 2 There-
fore, the court concluded "beyond a marine league" is the only
specific geographic boundary, and "high seas" is used merely in
conjunction.
The court also considered the impact of the 2000 and 2006
congressional amendments to DOHSA, and the relevance of leg-
islative history as an interpretive tool. In 2000, during the TWA
Flight 800 litigation, Congress proposed and subsequently passed
an amendment exempting "commercial aviation accident[s] oc-
26 Id. at 217.
27 Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., 637 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2011).
28 Id. at 991 (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
29 Id.
3o Id. at 992.
31 Id. at 990-93; Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners Inc., No. CV 09-1353 SVW
(FFMx), 2009 WL 2058541, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2009).
32 Helman, 637 F.3d at 991-92.
3 Id. at 992.
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curring on the high seas 12 nautical miles or less from the shore
of the United States," which Congress applied retroactively to
the day prior to the TWA 800 crash. 4 In light of this amend-
ment, the court reasoned "high seas" under DOHSA must in-
clude the area "twelve nautical miles or less" from shore,
otherwise a commercial airline exception would be unneces-
sary.15 The fact that Congress made this amendment retroactive
to the day before the crash is not coincidental, but illustrates
Congress's ability to clarify and direct courts' interpretation of
legislation. In 2006, Congress amended DOHSA, altering "be-
yond a marine league" to "beyond three nautical miles," which
the court interpreted as a clarification of the term "marine
league. 3 6 Congress had the opportunity to align the high seas
language with that of President Reagan's twelve nautical miles
proclamation, but rather chose to clarify the meaning of
"marine league. ' 37 In disagreeing with the Second Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished that decision on the basis that it was
made prior to the 2000 and 2006 amendments clarifying the lan-
guage. 8 The court also contemplated legislative history, which
was the primary consideration in TWA Flight 800, but concluded
the amendments render the statute unambiguous and analyzing
legislative history would be wholly unnecessary in light of a plain
reading of the statute.3 9
Finally, the court carefully considered President Reagan's
proclamation and the impact, if any, it would have on DOHSA.
In 1988, Reagan's Proclamation Number 5928 declared "[t]he
territorial sea of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nau-
tical miles from the baselines of the United States determined in
accordance with international law."'40 In TWA Flight 800, the
Second Circuit majority found this proclamation to alter
DOHSA's scope from three nautical miles to twelve nautical
41 themiles, on which the Helman plaintiffs relied.42 The Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that when DOHSA was passed, the Supreme Court
continually referred to "high seas" as international waters, and
4 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (2006); Helman, 637 F.3d at 991.
35 Helman, 637 F.3d at 991.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 992.
39 Id.
40 Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
41 In reAir Crash off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200, 213 (2d
Cir. 2000)
42 Helman, 637 F.3d at 992.
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DOHSA cannot be interpreted without an understanding of its
application and tie to international law.43 However, the Procla-
mation explicitly states that "[n]othing in this Proclamation...
extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or any
jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived there-
from. 44 Moreover, the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel published an opinion in conjunction with the Procla-
mation that states that statutes defining the term "territorial sea"
as "three miles seaward from the coast of the United States"
were not affected by the Proclamation. 45 The Ninth Circuit re-
lied on this reasoning and Congress's choice to amend DOHSA
to three nautical miles after the TWA Flight 800 decision to con-
clude that the Proclamation did not alter DOHSA.46
This case illustrates the challenges courts face when interpret-
ing the intent of another branch of government when the lan-
guage is less than clear and other courts and the Executive
Branch have offered conflicting interpretations. The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Helman appropriately considered the plain reading, statu-
tory construction, recent congressional amendments, the
Presidential Proclamation, and a contrary Second Circuit opin-
ion. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit properly ignored legislative
history in making the ruling. Courts avoid interpreting legisla-
tive history when the "'history is more conflicting than the text
is ambiguous,' , and the Supreme Court has stated thatjudicial
reliance on such history can provide legislators with "the power
and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legisla-
tive history to secure results they were unable to achieve
through the statutory text."" In TWA Flight 800, both the major-
ity and dissent relied heavily on legislative history to support
their conclusions. 49 The Ninth Circuit avoided such analysis
since any ambiguity was clarified by subsequent congressional
amendments.50 This case illustrates an ongoing dialogue be-
tween the branches of government when the courts interpret
43 In re Air Crash off Long Island, N. Y., 209 F.3d at 214-15.
44 Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. at 777.
45 Helman, 637 F.3d at 992.
46 Id. at 992-93.
47 Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 (2011) (quoting Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950)).
48 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
49 In re Air Crash off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200, 213,
221-24 (2d Cir. 2000).
50 Helman, 637 F.3d at 992.
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legislation to mean one thing and Congress then passes a law to
clarify its intent.
In Helman, the Ninth Circuit effectively clarified a point of law
concerning DOHSA that will greatly impact damages for per-
sonal representatives and aviation industry companies when a
wrongful death occurs beyond three nautical miles from the
U.S. shore. DOHSA limits recovery to "a fair compensation for
the pecuniary loss sustained by the individuals for whose benefit
the action is brought," as opposed to additional recovery for
nonpecuniary loss.5 Notably, Congress created a commercial
aviation exception, which does not apply here, but explicitly al-
lows additional compensation for nonpecuniary damages, mean-
ing "damages for loss of care, comfort, and companionship. 52
While Helman does not necessarily make it harder for a plaintiff
to recover, it does reduce the amount of damages available to a
plaintiff of a noncommercial accident. Prior to the commercial
exception, the Supreme Court held "'[w] here DOHSA applies,
neither state law.., nor general maritime law.., can provide a
basis for recovery of loss-of-society damages,'" or for a "dece-
dent's pre-death pain and suffering."53 Had California law been
applicable in Helman, plaintiffs could have sought recovery for
"loss of the society, comfort, care [,] and protection afforded by
the decedent. 54
Although a circuit split exists between the Second and Ninth
Circuits as to the geographical meaning of "high seas," it seems
unlikely the Supreme Court would need to rule on the issue due
to the intervening congressional amendments in 2000 and 2006
clarifying the statutory language.5 5 If another case presents the
issue for Supreme Court review, the fact that current Supreme
Court Justice Sotomayor wrote the Second Circuit dissent argua-
bly elevates the credibility of her opinion. Another point of con-
sideration, which the Ninth Circuit declined to rule on but
noted, is the possible constitutional problems that could arise if
an Executive Branch proclamation could dictate the meaning of
a congressional statute. 56 Constitutionally, the President has au-
51 46 U.S.C. § 30303 (2006) (emphasis added).
52 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (2006).
53 Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 120, 123 (1998).
54 See Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1977).
55 See Sup. CT. R. 13 (limiting the parties' opportunity to appeal for a writ of
certiorari to ninety days after the court of appeals enters a judgment, which has
expired for Helman).
56 Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., 637 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2011).
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thority over foreign relations, whereas Congress holds authority
over federal statutory remedies for wrongful deaths.57 An at-
tempt by the Executive Branch to take on a legislative role likely
violates the separation of powers.58
In light of the plain meaning, statutory construction, interven-
ing congressional amendments, and constitutional considera-
tions, the Ninth Circuit correctly decided DOHSA's application
to waters beyond three nautical miles from the shore, despite
the presidential extension of territorial waters. Helman will
likely impact attempts to recover for wrongful death resulting
from a noncommercial accident occurring beyond three nauti-
cal miles from the U.S. shore. The court applied sound reason-
ing to interpret statutory language consistent with congressional
intent, and avoided delving into murky legislative history where
past statutory ambiguity was resolved by subsequent amend-
ments. This ruling, if followed in other jurisdictions, will limit
recovery to compensation for pecuniary loss and preempt other
potentially more generous recovery under state or general mari-
time law.
57 Id.
58 See id.
210
